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-ED 
JLIN - 2 1981 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY MARTIN REDD, 
SHEILA M. REDD, his wife; 
STERLING HARDSON REDD, 
JILL D. REDD, his wife; 
PAUL DUTSON and DONNA 
DUTSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
WESTERN SAVINGS & LOAN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
····-····--·"··----------------~ 
C.I ~r1~. Su;::ir,ma Court, Utah" 
ADDITION OF 
NEW AUTHORITY TO BRIEF 
OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17231 
Defendant-respondent Western Savings and Loan Company 
(Western Savings), pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby submits additional authority in support 
of its position in the above-entitled case. 
Williams v. First Fede~al Savings and Loan Associa-
tion of Arlington, No. 80-1446 (4th Cir., filed May 26, 1981), 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," is an opinion deciding four 
separate ~ctions challenging the enforcement of due~on-sale 
clauses in Virginia. In Williams, two of the defendant-respon-
dent savings and loan associations were state chartered (as is 
Western Savings), and two were federally chartered. None of the 
Williams court's decisions which bear upon the case at bar turn 
upon the source of the savings and loan association's charter. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Williams supports Western Savings' arguments pre-
sented in its brief and at oral argument conducted May 12, 
1981, in the following respects: 
1. The Court of Appeals held that due-on-sale 
clauses do not constitute an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion and that there is nothing inherently unfair or unreason-
able in enforcing such provisions. See Williams, supra, at 
34-50. 
2. In making a detailed analysis of real estate 
financing, real estate marketing, and the impact of due-on-sale 
clauses, the court recognized that the appellants in Williams, 
as appellants in the case a~ bar: (1) are seeking to obtain 
unbargained for, windfall profits by transferring not only 
their properties but also their below-market-rate loans, see 
id. at 8-13, 34-50; and (2) are seeking "to shift to others 
burdens properly belonging on thei-r own shoulders." Id. at 
12-13. 
3. The court rejected the arguments presented in 
the case ~elied upon most heavily by appellants, Wellenkamp v. 
Bank of America, 21 Cal.3d 943, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), and ex-
posed the numerous flaws and non sequiturs in those arguments. 
See Williams at n. 29. 
4. The court rejected the argument that the due-
on-sale clause was intended only as a protection of the lender's 
security interest. See id. at n. 36. 
-2-
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5. In their brief, appellants contended that they 
would be forced to pay a prepayment penalty in addition to the 
accelerated balance of the loan. At oral argument, Western 
Savings' counsel rebutted this contention by informing the 
court that 12 C.F.R. B-3(g) (2), which prohibits collection of 
a prepayment penalty when a loan balance is accelerated, was 
applicable to Western Savings pursuant to Sections 7-7-5.1 and 
7-13-74, Utah Code Annotated. In Williams, the court recog-
nized that 12 C.F.R. B-3(g) (2) prohibited collection of a pre-
payment penalty when the due-on-sale provisions were invoked. 
See Williams, supra, at 34 and n. 38. 
6. The enforceability of the due-on-sale clause in 
the case at bar is even stronger than in Williams. Like 
Williams, there is no allegation or evidence to suggest there 
is anything "amiss" in Western Savings' acceleration procedures. 
But unlike Williams, where there was a substantial question 
whether the method of transfer of the subject property 
"triggered" the due-on-sale clause, there is no question that 
Western Savings' due-on-sale clause expressly covered the trans-
fer of the subject 24-unit apartment complex pursuant to a 
contract of sale. 
Pursuant to Rule 73(p) (3), the correcting page con-
taining the above-described newly uncovered authority is filed 
herewith. 
-3-
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DATED this 2nd day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard W. Giauque 
James R. Holbrook 
Stephen T. Hard 
GIAUQUE, HOLBROOK, BENDINGER 
& GURMANKIN, P.C. 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
By,q~z• 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Addition of New Authority to Brief of Respondent and Newly 
Uncovered Authority for Brief of Respondent, page 9, were 
hand delivered to Neil R. Sabin of Stringham, Larsen, Mazuran 
& Sabin, 200 North Main Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84103, thi> 2nd day of Jun~~ 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
Jeffrey W. Williams 
Susan K. Williams 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
No. 80-1446 
On their own behalf and as 
representatives of a class 
of homeowners 
J. Peter Bittner 
Marsha H. Bittner 
Mary S. Boyd 
Richard E. Nault, 
v. 
First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Arlington 
Individually and as rep. of a 
class of lenders 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 
Arlington-Fairfax Savings and 
Loan Association 
Herndon Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, 
Arthur G. Pote 
Laura R. Pote 
Angel Saltos 
Beatriz De Saltos, 
v. 
No. 81-1005 
Washington-Lee Savings and 
Loan Association, 
FILED 
!AAY 2 61981 
U. :;. Court of Appeals 
Fourth Circi:it 
Appellants, 
Appellees. 
Appellants, 
Appellee. 
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Oren R. Lewis, Senior District 
Judge. 
Argued March 5, 1981 Decided May 26, 1981 
Before BUTZNER, PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges. 
Paul D. Scanlon for Appellants; E. Waller Dudley and Robert Lasky 
(Boothe, Prichard & Dudley; Paul C. Kincheloe, Jr.; Kincheloe & 
Carlson; Jesse B. Wilson, III; Mccandlish, Lillard, Church & Best; 
Robert T. Lasky; Mark c. Ellenberg; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft 
on brief in No. 80-1446) (W. Curtis Sewell; John E. Coffey; Thomas 
& Sewell on brief in Nos. 80-1446 and 81-1005) for appellees. 
- la -
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~URNAGHAN, Circuit Judge: 
The case touches many Americans, for it involves the common 
experience of purchasing a home. Customarily one contemplates a 
borrowing secured by a lien on the residential parcel to meet a 
substantial portion of the purchase price. Few are able first, 
before buying a house, to accrue all the necessary funds. 
It is from that common experience that the present case 
evolves. The facts are influenced by another common experience 
of less ancient lineage, namely, persistent, consistently high, 
rates of inflation, accompanied by increased interest rates. 
1 
The plaintiffs in the four consolidated cases are (a) in 
two of the cases, the persons who, when they bought their homes some 
time ago, imposed deeds of trust on the parcels of residential real 
1 Three of the cases, given the combination title of Williams, 
et al. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, et al., 
No. 80-1446, were consolidated for trial below. The fourt.~, 
Pote v. Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association, No. 81-1005, 
was consolidated with the others on appeal. 
- 2 -
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estate as security for loans incurred to meet part of the purchase 
price and (b) in all four cases, the persons who subsequently bought 
tne real estate, and, in doing so, sought to assume the liabilities 
secured by the deeds of trust and to have them continue in force for 
the balance of their original terms, typically 30 years. The 
defendants are the lending institutions, and the questions at issue 
all coalesce into the ultimate one of whether provisions in the 
deeds of trust known as due-on-sale clauses purporting to permit 
acceleration of the maturity of the loans upon sales of the premises 
2 (a) were triggered, and (b), if triggered, were legally enforceable. 
2 Williams, et al. v. First Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, et al., involving three of the transactions before us, 
attacks only on the grounds that the due-on-sale clauses were 
not triggered, in view of the form the transactions took. 
Pote v. Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association raises 
that question and the additional contention as well, that, 
if the due-on-sale clause was, indeed, triggered, it was, 
nevertheless, legally unenforceable. 
A preliminary matter for consideration is the one of our 
jurisdiction to hear the cases. The Pote case presents no 
problem inasmuch as the parties are dIVerse. The Potes are 
residents of Michigan. The persons to whom they sold, the 
Saltos, are residents of Columbia. The defendant Washington-
Lee Savings and Loan Association is a Virginia corporation 
with its principal office in Virginia. 
Jurisdiction in the other three cases is not quite so certain. 
No diversity jurisdiction has been asserted, presumably because 
of the commonality of citizenship o~ some,of the homeowners 
and of the lenders. 
However, in the case of Williams v. First Federal Savings 
- 3 -
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We choose, for simplicity's sake, in dealing with the 
first question, which is whether the due-on-sale clauses were, in 
(Cont'd) 
and Loan Association of Arlington, a federal question under 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 has been raised. The deed of trust in that 
case was executed on April 27, 1977, well after the June 8 
1976 effective date of regulations of the Federal Home Loa~ 
Bank Board ("FHLBB"), originally codified as 12 C.F.R. 
§ 545.6-ll(f} and (g) and recodified in 1980 as 12 C.F.R. 
§ 545.8-3(f) and (g). Those regulations provide, inter alia: 
An association continues to have the 
power to include, as a matter of contract 
between it and the borrower, a provision 
in its loan instrument whereby the associa-
tion may, at its option, declare immediately 
due and payable sums secured by the asso-
ciation's security instrument if all or 
any part of the real property securing the 
loan is sold or transferred by the borrower 
without the association's prior written 
consent. 
The deed of trust, on a uniform instrument form for use in 
Virginia for deeds of trust within the purview of operations 
by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"} and 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC"), employed 
essentially the regulation language: 
If all or any part of the Property or an 
interest therein is sold or transferred by 
Borrower without Lender's prior written con-
sent, ..• Lender may, at Lender's option, 
declare all sums secured by this Deed of 
Trust to be immediately due and payable. 
Thus, the federal question arises as to whether, as a 
matter of contract between the lender and the borrower, a 
provision having been included declaring immediately due 
and payable the deed of trust if all or any part of the real 
property securing the loan was sold or transferred, the trans-
actions through which Mrs. Bailey and the Williams changed 
- 4 -
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fact, triggered, to single out for detailed description the trans-
actions involving Jeffrey W. Williams et ux, since their case is 
the one which happens to supply the caption for reference purposes. 
However, since Thomas A. Bailey and Sharon S. Bailey actually had 
the contractual relations with First Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion of Arlington, and not the Williams, who merely sought to assume 
the obligation of Mrs. Bailey (to whom all joint interests in the 
property had been conveyed by Mr. Bailey), we concentrate on the 
interests of Mrs. Bailey through whom the rights of the Williams 
derive. 
2 (Cont'd) 
beneficial ownership constituted a sale or transfer as 
contemplated by the regulation. 
It is true that the deed of trust states that it shall 
be governed by the law of Virginia, the jurisdiction in 
which the property is located. That language, however, re-
lates to the validity or invalidity of provisions and does 
not extend to questions of which, as between competing 
interpretations, should be accorded language when either 
would be perfectly valid. 
The other two cases (Boyd v. Arlington-Fairfax Savings and 
Loan Association and Milne v. Herndon Federal Savings and Loan 
Association) are les3 certain as to jurisdiction, either 
because the association is state chartered or because the 
deed of trust, while to a federal savings and loan association, 
antedated the FHLBB re~ulations and did not conform to thero 
in its language. Neve~theless, we proceed on the belief that 
they, too, oroperly rais~ a federal queseion. If, in fact, 
they should.have been disnissed for want of jurisdiction, in 
view of the conclusions we have reached on the law, the 
result would not, because of stare decisis, significantly 
differ from a holding affirming the lower court. 
- 5 -
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On April 27, 1977, the Baileys purchased a home located 
ai 8061 Powder Brook Lane, Springfield, Virginia. In Virginia, 
the forms used to impose a mortgage security interest, or lien, 
on land commonly employed in other parts of the United States are 
not used. Instead, resort has been to the deed of trust. While 
the formalities differ, for many essential intents and purposes, 
though by no means all, a deed of trust is equivalent to a mortgage. 
See Larchmont Homes, Inc. v. Annandale Water co., 201 Va. 
178:-TBl, 110 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1959) ("Black defines a deed 
of trust at page 503 as 'an instrument in use in many states, 
taking the place and serving the uses of a common-law mortgage, 
by which the legal title to real property is placed in one or 
more trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or 
the performance of other conditions.'"); Yasuna v. Miller, 399 
A.2d 68, 71-72 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1979) ("Deeds of trust are 
viewed as generally equivalent to common law mortgages, a 
mortgage being by definition an interest in property given 
as security for the payment of a debt."); LeBrun v. Prosise, 
3 
197 Md. 466, 473-74, 79 A.2d 543, 547 (1951) ("This deed of 
trust is like deeds of trust which, we understand, are generally 
used in Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia in 
lieu of mortgages and are not infrequently so used in Montgomery 
and Prince George's Counties and perhaps in other counties 
bordering on the Potomac. It is also similar to deeds of trust 
ordinarily executed by corporations to secure issues of nego-
tiable or transferable bonds. For most purposes any such deed 
of trust is a mortgage, .•. and is subject to some (but not 
all) statutory provisions relating to mortgages •••. On the 
other hand, some statutory provisions distinguish between 
'mortgage' or 'deed in the nature of a mortgage' and 'deeds of 
trust in the nature of mortgages' .•.• "); but cf. Billingsley 
v. Mitchell, 257 Md. 301, 304, 262 A.2d 746, 747 (1970) (" .•• 
a deed of trust securing a debt although it serves the purpose 
and performs the function of a mortgage is not in the eyes of 
the Maryland law a mortgage or a deed in the nature of a mort-
gage, .... "). 
- 6 -
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While appellants urge that differences in the two types 
of security device play a relevant role in the formulation of the 
method employed to shift ownership of the homes in the several 
consolidated cases, and, in particular, from Mrs. Bailey to the 
4 Williams, it is not evident to us why that is so. 
The purchase price paid by the Baileys on April 27, 1977 
($63,831) was met in part by a loan from First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association of Arlington, in the face amount of $55,000 at 
the time of settlement, secured by a deed of trust. By 1980, the 
outstanding principal had been reduced to $53,903.63. The term of 
the loan was 30 years. Interest on the loan was fixed at 10% per 
5 
annum. Repayment was to be made in level monthly installments 
Thus, for example, the mortgagor owns an equity of redemp-
tion. A trustee, like a mortgagee, holds legal title, and the 
borrower has only equitable interests. ~ Everette v. 
Woodward, 162 Va. 419, 426, 174 S.E. 864, 867 (1934) ("The 
trustee's power of sale is coupled with an interest; that is, 
he holds the legal title, while the granter in the trust 
deed has the equitable title."). 
5 Some of the precise figures for the Bailey-Williams trans-
action do not appear in the record. We deprecate the failure 
of counsel to include in the record so relevant a document as 
the note secured by the deed of trust from the Baileys, con-
taining as it does particulars of the loan terms. We have 
been able, nevertheless, to make reasonably accurate approxima-
tions. The figures need be only approximate for the illustrative 
purposes they serve. ' 
Thus the 1977 interest rate applicable to the Bailey's 
borrowing from First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Arlington was somewhere between 10% and 10:25% per annum. For 
convenience, we shall refer to the annual interest rate payable 
by Mrs. Bailey as 10%. 
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of $492. The deed of trust dated April 27, 1977, constituted a 
first lien in favor of the lender, First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Arlington. 
On October 3, 1977, Mr. Bailey had relinquished all his 
interest in the Springfield, Virginia premises to Mrs. Bailey. She, 
in 1979, decided to sell. In the interim, since the time of the 
1977 purchase, interest rates on financing for purposes of acquir-
ing a house had radically altered, with the going rate having risen 
to approximately 15% per annum instead of the 10% financing which 
had been available to the Baileys when they purchased in 1977. As 
a consequence, in the secondary market in first mortgages, the 
actual value of the loan secured by the Bailey deed of trust was 
approximately $38,000, despite its face value of $53,903.63. In 
other words, a discount of approximately 29% had occurred. 
To guard against the possibility of the adverse impact 
of such discounts, home lending organizations had resorted to 
insertion in the instruments covering loan trans.ictions of "due-
6 
on-sale" clauses. The clauses provided that, on transfer of the 
6 Three of the four deeds of trust (one for each of the 
consolidated cases) employed a June, 1975 uniform instrument of 
the FNMA and the FHLMC, instrumentalitie~ which, in conjunc-
tion with the FHLBB operated to further interests of the 
Federal Government in the residential lending area. Two of 
the four lenders (First Federal Savings and Loan Association 
of Arlington and Herndon Federal Savings and Loan Association) 
- 8 -
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premises, by the borrower, unless the approval or consent of 
the lender was first obtained, the loan would be fully callable, 
7 
becoming immediately due and payable, at the option of the lender. 
6 (Cont'd) 
include in their titles the word "federal." Interestingly, the 
only lender to use another deed of trust form than the uniform 
FNMA-FHLMC document was one of the federal associations, Herndon 
Federal Savings and Loan Association. In the case of Arlington-
Fairfax Savings and Loan Association, the appellants treated it 
as a federal association, asserting in the Complaint that it is 
"a federal savings and loan association under the provisions 
of the Horne OWner's Loan Act, 12 u.s.c. § 1461, et seq. 
(Arlington-Fairfax converted)." Similarly, withrespect to 
Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association the Complaint 
alleged: "The Defendant is a state chartered Savings and 
Loan Association: a Federal Home Loan Bank Member; Seller 
Servicer for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and an 
insured institution of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation" and "a Federally related Lender." 
In all events the deed of trust forms employed in general 
represented a nationwide federal policy favoring due-on-sale 
clauses. 
7 The language in the Bailey deed of trust on April 27, 1977, 
in favor of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Arlington read: "Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all 
or any of the Property or an interest therein is sold or 
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written con-
sent, excluding (a) Creation of a lien or encumbrance sub-
ordinate to this Deed of Trust .•. Lender may, at Lender's 
option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to 
be immediately due and payable. • " 
That language, from Section 17 of the Uniform FNMA-FHLMC 
instrument form, also was used in the case of the Pote deed of 
trust to Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association dated 
March 14, 1976. 
For another lender, Arlington-Fairfax Savinqs and Loan Asso-
ciation (the borrower being Mary S. Boyd), the phraseology 
- 9 -
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In current market conditions, the due-on-sale clause 
obviously would be viewed with distaste by people in the shoes of 
7 (Cont'd) 
under the deed of trust of November 29, 1977, initially was 
identical with that appearing in the Bailey-Williams and Pote 
deeds of trust. However, by an agreement of modification, 
also dated November 29, 1977, the language was changed to read: 
"IN THE EVENT TITLE to the property above described is trans-
ferred, the unpaid balance of the indebtedness hereby secured 
shall be immediately due and payable, at the option of the party 
cf the third part." 
In the case of Herndon Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
which had on June 24, 1975, made a secured loan to John K. 
Milne et ux. the language ran: "If the aforesaid described 
property is sold or conveyed prior to the maturity date of 
the note hereinabove described and secured hereby, the said 
note shall be immediately due and payable in full at the option 
of the holder thereof." 
Each deed of trust in the consolidated cases also contained 
in the margin the following capitalized statement: 
NOTICE: THE DEBT SECURED HEREBY IS 
SUBJECT TO CALL IN FULL OR THE TERMS THEREOF 
BEING MODIFIED IN THE EVENT OF SALE OR CON-
VEYANCE OF THE PROPERTY CONVEYED (or SECURED 
HEREBY). 
The statement was mandated by Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34 reading: 
Where any loan is made secured by a 
mortgage or deed of trust on real property 
... and the note, or mortgage or deed of 
trust evidencing such loan contains a provi-
sion that the holder of the note secured by 
such mortgage or deed of trust may accelerate 
payment of or renegotiate the terms of su~h 
loan upon sale or conveyance of the security 
property or part thereof, then the mortgage 
or deed of trust shall contain in the body or 
on the margin thereof a [the following] s~ate­
ment either in capital letters or underlined: 
"Notice -- The debt secured hereby is subject 
- 10 -
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Mrs. Bailey, for a mortgage or deed of trust which could other-
wise continue until the original fixed maturity date (here 2007) 
;t an extremely favorable interest rate (10% as against the cur-
rent 15%) would be lost to them. Such a loan, if transferable 
to a buyer through assumption thereof as part of his purchasing 
arrangements, would have a distinct economic value. To illustrate, 
Mrs. Bailey, if the loan were transferable, would be able to realize 
more from the sale of her house than if she were forced to comply 
8 
with the due-on-sale clause. 
7 (Cont'd) 
to call in full or the terms thereof being 
modified in the event of sale or convey-
ance of the property conveyed [secured 
hereby]." 
The bracketed language appeared in the initial enactment by 
Ch. 292 of the Acts of 1974. The word immediately before the 
bracketed language, in each case, was substituted by Ch. 448 
of the Acts of 1975, and, for our purposes, effected no sub-
stantive alteration. 
A companion statute, Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.33, contem-
poraneously enacted and reenacted in 1974 and 1975, prohibited 
any lender from collecting or receiving any prepayment penalty 
if prepayment should result from the enforcement of the 
right to call the loan upon the sale of the real property 
securing the loan. 
8 For example, an unencumbered house might have a market 
value of $100,000. If it had an unexpired mortgage or deed 
of trust on it covering an outstanding unpaid balance of 
$50,000 payable over another 27 years at a rate of 10%, and 
that obligation could be transferred, in today's market that 
house would realize something in the neighborhood of $115,000, 
i.e. more than the property free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances would bring. 
It is no answer to that somewhat anomalous state of affairs 
- 11 -
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In the final analysis, one must conclude that 
people like Mrs. Bailey are simply too eager to shift to others 
(Cont'd) 
that the person owning the house outright could also realize 
$115,000 by himself granting a purchase money mortgage or 
purchase money deed of trust at 10% for 27 vears. The exten-
sion of such unrealistically favorable borrowing terms would 
represent an economic disadvantage here capable of evaluation 
at $15,000. The outright owner of his house who would have 
to impose on himself the $15,000 economic disadvantage would 
consequently be worse off than a couple who, were they able 
to effect a transfer of the loan, would be able to keeo the 
entire $15,000, placing the economic disadvantage on a· third 
party, the deed of trust lender. So, Mrs. Bailey and her 
co-appellants argue for a result under which they would be 
better off than a prudent couple who owned their home free 
and clear. 
In the case of a property worth $100,000 if totally unen-
cumbered, which is subject to a mortgage or deed of trust with 
27 years still to run at an interest rate of 10% per annum, 
and the outstanding unpaid principal amounting to $50,000, 
let us assume that buyers would be willing to pay cash of 
$65,000, and either (a) assume the favorable 10% mortgage of 
$50,000, or (bl, if they must, go into the current mortgage 
market and pay its equivalent. The equivalent, in approximate 
terms, would be a $35,000 27 year mortgage at 15%. (The 
monthly level payments on $50,000 at 10% per annum would be 
substantially the same as the monthly payments on $35,000 at 
15%.) 
Under the former procedure, the selling couple would net 
$6~,ooo, since they would need pay nothing towards satisfaction 
of r.he deed of trust note (assuming no subsequent default by 
the buyers). Under the latter procedure, however, the deed 
of tr11st note would have to be satisfied in full. The applica-
tion of the $35,000 in new borrowing would still leave unpaid 
$15,000 which would have to come out of the $65,000 so that the 
sellers would net $50,000. 
Since the seller, for a $100,000 house, would be freed of 
an outstanding obligation of $50,000, and additionally receive 
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burdens properly belonging on their own shoulders. Even if 
the due-on-sale clause is valid, and has been triggered, and 
Mrs. Bailey, must, therefore, accelerate and pay off the balance 
due on her deed of trust loan, she, nevertheless, has been a 
beneficiary economically, vis-~-vis the deed of trust lender, 
as a result of the borrowing. The effects of inflation have 
served to erode the real, as distinct from the face, value of 
money. Hence, paying off $53,903.63 borrowed in 1977 with 
$53,903.63 of 1980 or 1981 dollars provides Mrs. Bailey with a 
9 
tidy economic advantage. 
8 (Cont'd) 
$50,000 in cash, he would be as well off economically as a 
homeowner having title free and clear, and netting $100,000. 
Mrs. Bailey's contentions, consequently, were they to succeed, 
would yield to her not only whatever profit inheres in the rise 
in the real estate market (in the world of today, it was to be 
expected that she and Mr. Bailey bought the house for less than 
the $79,903.63 which was the price at which she sold to the 
Williams. The purchase price was, in fact, $63,831.) It would 
also additionally confer on her an artificial profit attributable 
to the decline in value of the deed of trust loan. "What the 
seller is then selling is his mortgage rate, and not his property • 
• . . the mortgagor has already benefited from the loan terms, 
and providing the benefit of transferability of those terms in 
a pricing context ... is a windfall." Article, Enforcement of 
Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 Real Property, Probate and Trust 
Journal 891, 926, 930 (1978) (hereafter "Enforcement"). Yet 
the Baileys were not the investors, the risk takers, on the loan. 
Nothing in reason commends a rule which would lead to such a 
windfall. 
9 As it happens, Mrs. Bailey enjoyed another advantage not vouch-
safed to all home borrowers. First Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation of Arlington had sold a 90% interest in her obligation 
to the FHLMC. consequently, purchasers from her, if credit-
worthy, could arrange assumption for a 1% assumption fee. 
- 13 -
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I. Sale, Conveyance or Transfer. 
The first thrust on behalf of appellants, in the jousting 
with the savings and loan association lenders, is a contention that 
the residential properties never were "sold or transferred," or 
10 
"sold or conveyed" or that title was not "transferred." Hence, 
the contention runs, the due-on-sale clauses have never, in fact, 
operated to accelerate the loans. Reliance is placed on the arti-
ficially elaborate form of the transactions employed for trans-
ferring title to the purchasers. 
The transactions between Mrs. Bailey and the Williams 
began routinely enough. On November 7, 1979, Mrs. Bailey entered 
a typical form real estate contract containing terms of sale, 
and details as to settlement, brokerage commissions, and the like. 
Foreshadowing what was to come, however, the November 7, 1979 
contract, in an addendum, described the subject of the sale as 
the beneficial interest in a land trust to be created by Mrs. 
Bailey. 
That contract of November 7, 1979 was reinforced by 
one of the following day, November 8, 1979, called a "Contract 
10 The assertion is made, mind you, despite the candid ad-
mission in Appellants' reply brief that: wsome Appellants, 
indeed, sold their 'principal residences' .•. to other 
Appellants who use the residences as their 'homes.'" 
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to Purchase by Assignment the Beneficial Interest in a Land Trust 
Holding Real Estate." It called for Mrs. Bailey to name herself 
as trustee and to bring about a situation in which she, individually, 
and she, as trustee, between them would have "full and complete 
legal and equitable title ... without lien or encumbrance of any 
kind, except as noted in any Deed of Trust on the real estate 
No point has been made that those contracts, of them-
selves, operated to trigger the due-on-sale clause. We, there-
fore, do not address that question, which might not prove easy of 
resolution. On the one hand, the contracts did not affect possession, 
but only the right to possession, upon satisfaction of contingencies, 
especially meeting of the purchase price. On the other hand, equit-
able title in the Williams, whatever verbiage to the contrary may 
have been employed, was created by the contracts of November 7, 
1979 and November 8, 1979. See Bellingham First Federal Savings & 
Loan Association v. Garrison, 87 Wash.2d 437, 439, 553 P.2d 1090, 1091 
(1976) ("Thus the real estate contract executed by appellants and 
defendants is an 'inter vivos transfer' within the meaning of the 
[due-on-sale] clause."); Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Association 
v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 105, 295 N.W.2d 762, 766 
(1973) ("In view of common and technical usage of the term 'convey' 
and the purpose of the 'due on sale clause' of the mortgage and 
- 15 -
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note, there is no ambiguity. The land contract was a conveyance 
that gave the purchaser an equitable title to the property as well 
as the immediate right to possession."). See Terry v. Born, 24 wash. 
APP. 6 5 2 , 6 0 4 P • 2 d 5 0 4 ( 19 7 9) . 
Rather, the argument of the lenders derives from the 
fact that Mrs. Bailey, on January 15, 1980, created a trust 
(secondary, of course, and subject to the 1977 security deed of 
trust), by means of a document entitled "Declaration and Deed into 
a Land Trust." Mrs. Bailey, individually, granted, bargained, and 
assigned to herself as Trustee the parcel in Springfield, Virginia 
"to have and to hold . . . in fee simple The Trustee's 
power to sell was conditioned on receipt of a consent to do so 
from the trust beneficiary. The Declaration and Deed into a Land 
Trust was recorded among the land records of Fairfax County, 
Virginia. 
Mrs. Bailey, as Trustee, also on January 15, 1980, 
entered into a land trust agreement with herself, designating 
herself as sole beneficiary of the land trust, and providing that 
the property had to be sold within twenty years. Since, apart 
from the November 7, 1979 and November 8, 1979 contracts with 
the Williams, even without the January 15, 1980 agreement, only 
the 1977 security deed of trust stood between 'Mrs. Bailey and 
absolute title, legal and equitable, it may be questioned whether 
the agreement was other than a superfluity. See Larchmont Homes, 
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Inc. v. Annandale Water Co., supra, 201 Va. at 181-82, 110 S.E.2d 
at 252. Cf. as to an analogous development re mortgages, 4 Restatement, 
Property § 415, Comment a (1944). The purpose, apparently was to 
effect a change in legal nomenclature so that all interests other 
than the 1977 deed of trust would be denominated personal property, 
not real property. 
The conveyance to herself, creating the second trust, and 
the land trust agreement with herself, designating herself as sole 
beneficiary, the argument of appellants runs, were not contemplated 
by the terms of the due-on-sale clause. The due-on-sale clause 
was to become operative only in the event of a transfer of title. 
To appreciate the argument, one readily perceives that the title 
has not essentially been affected in any way by the second deed 
of trust, since beneficial interests of record remain exactly as 
they were before the January 15, 1980 deed of trust and the January 
15, 1980 agreement were executed. Their sole effect, if any, was 
to transform from "real" to "personal" in the hands of Mrs. Bailey 
the rights to enjoy, occupy, and otherwise exercise rights of 
ownership associated with possession. To put it succinctly, 
there was formally a "conveyance" but substantively no "transfer." 
The District Court, nevertheless, concluded that the 
mere change in the form of the title, accomplished as it was by 
"grant, bargain and sale" triggered the due-on-sale clause. Since 
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no substantial change was accomplished we may have reservations 
about that conclusion, but it makes no matter. 
For then came the ingenious next step in the transaction, 
one which Mrs. Bailey claims was a "transfer" but not a "conveyance." 
(Now you see it, now you don't.) Also on January 15, 1980, Mrs. 
Bailey executed an "Assignment of Beneficial Interest in Land Trust" 
undertaking to "sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over" all 
rights, power, privileges and beneficial interest, including all in-
terest in the property, subordinate to the 1977 deed of trust for the 
benefit of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington, 
as lender. (Emphasis added.) That document manifestly encompassed 
11 
all rights of enjoyment, occupancy, and use, in perpetuity. How-
ever, appellants strive to place great reliance on the consideration 
12 
that the subject of the transfer was personal property. 
Of course, one must wonder, in the year of our Lord, One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-One, what significance the 
11 Counsel for appellants has written a brochure describing what 
was assigned as "the exclusive right to exercise the normal 
incidents of ownership." 
12 The argument derives from the provision in Va. Ann. Code 
§ 55-17.1 governing creation of land trusts stating that the 
interest of a beneficiary of a land trust should "be deemed to 
be personal property.w The language was ·added to the statute 
in 1975. 
But such "deeming" could not, by the express terms of the 
statute be "construed . . • to affect any right which a 
creditor may otherwise have against a trustee or beneficiary. 
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maneuvering has had. The end result, with the Williams occupying 
the property, is essentially no different from the situation the 
Williams would have been in as purchasers in the customary real 
estate sales transaction. There can be no doubt that, had a 
customary real estate deed been employed to accomplish directly 
the essentially identical result reached by Mrs. Bailey's cir-
13 
cuitous route, the due-on-sale clause would have been triggered. 
If one travels by by-roads rather than use an interstate highway, 
but ends up at the same destination, the journey has nonetheless 
13 The appellants frankly concede in their Brief that the 
Williams "now enjoy the structure as their home." 
Indeed, it goes further than that. Paul D. Scanlon, Esq. 
and Paul D. Scanlon, Ltd., which we take to be a professional 
association controlled by him, not only argued for all appel-
lants in the consolidated cases. Paul D. Scanlon, or his 
professional association, was a participant in the transac-
tions leading up to the litigation, accepting fees from both 
buyer and seller in each case. 
Counsel for appellants, therefore, can hardly fail to 
contend that he effectively produced, in return for his fees, 
a beneficial holding in the Williams, Mr. Nault, the Bittners 
and the Saltos, respectively, equal in substance to that 
which a customary real estate transaction involving purchase 
of a home would have provided. 
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taken place. In their contract with the Williams, Mrs. Bailey 
has been designated: "Seller.• 14 
That is where attempted ingenuity again enters the 
picture. Appellants argue that the due-on-sale clause goes 
into operation only in the event of a "conveyance" or a "transfer 
of title" of real estate. They point to instances where, using 
the words technically, for particular purposes, "conveyance" and 
"transfer of title" concern only transfer of full legal, or, at 
14 The contract further incorporated into itself by reference 
the language of "a form contract" for "the sale and purchase 
of real estate, setting forth the terms and conditions of 
sale between the parties and warranties, covenants and con-
ditions to be performed by the respective parties" provided 
only that the subject matter of the contract should be "THE 
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE LAND TRUST HEREIN ABOVE MENTIONED." 
In a purely conclusory way, manifestly not binding on the 
lender under the deed of trust, who was not a party to the 
contracts between Mrs. Bailey and the Williams, nor binding 
on the court as to what the contract in fact constituted or 
accomplished, the contract added: "The use of the attached 
contract form is for the convenience of the parties and is 
in no way to be interpreted as contemplating or intending 
that the parties are agreeing to sell or purchase a real 
estate interest, either legal or equitable." The plain fact 
is that the Williams did purchase an interest in real estate 
from Mrs. Bailey, whether or not, as between themselves, they 
might choose to treat it as personalty. Two of us may agree 
that the emperor is clothed, and are, therefore, estopped to 
deny that he is caparisoned cap-a-pie. A third party is 
nonetheless free to cry out the true fact that his imperial 
majesty is as naked as the day he was born. 
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15 
the very least, equitable title. And if an interest in real 
estate is called personal property in one set of circumstances, 
what it is called, they assert, takes precedence over what it is 
for every purpose. Title to real property, they urge, cannot en-
16 
compass an interest which is merely "personal." 
15 See Larchmont Homes, Inc. v. Annandale Water co., supra, 
201 Va. at 181, 110 S.E.2d at 251 where the meaning of convey-
ance is discussed. Black's Law Dictionary is quoted: 
In real property law. In the strict 
legal sense, a transfer of legal title to 
land. In the popular sense, and as gen-
erally used by lawyers, it denotes any 
transfer of title, legal or equitable .. 
16 The argument has a fundamental frailty. Bouvier contains 
an enlightening discussion of the definition of "Title" derived 
from Blackstone: 
There are several stages or degrees 
requisite to form a complete title to lands 
and tenements. The lowest and most imperfect 
degree of title is a presumptive title or the 
mere possession, or actual occupation of the 
estate, without any apparent right to hold or 
continue such possession . . . • The next 
step to a good and perfect title is the 
right of possession, which may reside in 
one man while the actual possession is not 
in himself, but in another. 
2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 3281 (8th ed. 1914) (emphasis 
in original). 
Thus a couple such as the Williams had a kind of title, 
however it was denominated, since they had the full right of 
occupancy or possession. 
Indeed, it should be noted that what reliance appellants 
place in the word "title" is confined exclusively to the 
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They then seek to build on that base by reliance on the 
~rgument that, in cases of ambiguity, the ambiguity shall be resolved 
against the preparer of the document, especially one possessing 
16 (Cont'd) 
Boyd-Fairfax Savings and Loan Association deed of trust. There 
the due-on-sale clause operates if the "title is transferred." 
As to the others, the controlling language is "Property or 
an interest therein is sold or transferred," or "property is 
sold or conveyed." In each of those cases, the property, 
irrespective of whether it was real property or personal 
property, was unmistakably "sold." Cf. Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 
42, 46, 227 A.2d 26, 27 (1967), holdTng that an oral agree-
ment, unenforceable under the statute of frauds, constituted 
a sale for purposes of a provision reading: "in the event the 
Mortgagors sell the property hereby mortgaged .... " 
Of course, over and beyond its other defects, the improba-
bility of the reading advocated by appellants is fatal. In 
choosing language to create "uniform covenants for national 
use ... to constitute a uniform security instrument cover-
ing real property," the federal agencies never intended that 
the transfers with which we are here concerned should be 
entirely free of the due-on-sale clause. Such an interpreta-
tion would obliterate the uniformity sought. 
Nor is it an answer for appellants to point to the language 
of the ·FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust form reading: "This Deed of 
Trust shall be governed by the laws of the jurisdiction in 
which the Property is located." Apart from the restraint on 
alienation and antitrust contentions which we shall hereafter 
demonstrate to be unfounded, there is nothing in Virginia law 
which would preclude a definition of "sale," "conveyance," 
or "transfer" so as to reach the land trust transactions 
entered among the appellants. We find as a matter of con-
struction that the due-on-sale clauses in all of the con-
solidated cases were triggered. 
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-17 
special knowledge, and especially when the document derogates 
a~ainst the common law right of free alienation. 18 While it is 
true that ambiguities are resolved against the party preparing 
the contract, Baird v. Dodson Bros. Exterminating Co., Inc., 217 
Va. 745, 749, 232 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1977); VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone 
Star Industries, Inc., 215 Va. 366, 371, 209 S.E.2d 909, 913 (1974), 
where a document is clear and unambiguous, the doctrine does not 
apply. William Schluderberg-T.J. Kurdle Co. v. Trice, 198 Va. 85, 88-
89, 92 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1956); ~People's Bank of Rural Retreat 
v. People's National Bank of Abingdon, 148 Va. 651, 659-60, 139 S.E. 
325, 327 (1927) . 19 Here, bearing in mind the nature of a transaction 
17 Cf. the rule that insurance policies will be construed 
mos~strictly against the insurer. 17 Arn. Jur. 2d § 276, p. 
690 (1972); 4 Williston On Contracts, § 621, pp. 764-72 (3d ed. 
1961). 
18 As restraints on alienation are not favored, conditions 
against alienation are strictly construed, and, even if they 
would otherwise be valid, are ineffectual unless certainly and 
clearly expressed. 61 Arn. Jur. 2d § 96 at 94 (1972). However, 
as we shall later elaborate, there is here no forbidden restraint 
on alienation. 
19 See 17 Arn. Jur. 2d S 276, p. 691 (1972): 
These principles apply only where a 
contract is open to more than one reason-
able construction, and should not be applied 
to reach an unreasonable construction in 
defiance of the terms of the contract, or to 
overturn the intention of the parties when it 
is clearly manifest from the entire contract. 
Furthermore, the rule that expressions will be 
interpreted against the party selecting and . 
using them applies only where, after the.ordin-
ary rules of construction have been applied, the 
agreement is still ambiguous. (Footnotes omitted). 
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by which funds are lent to a home purchaser, there is no ambiguity. 
Thus, "sold," "conveyed," and "transferred" used in each of the 
deeds of trust clearly extended to the land trust transactions, 
toppling the house of cards. 
The patent error of appellants is their effort to isolate 
each instrument and say that it, by itself, is not a conveyance of 
beneficial interests, or not a deed to real estate, so no single 
document fitting the due-on-sale clause definition exists. It is, 
however, no more than if appellants were to say that 1/3 is not 1, 
when one is the requisite number. While the statement may be true 
so far as it goes, the production of three l/3s will serve, and 
that is all that has happened here. Putting the numerous papers 
all together they, as part of a single, integrated transaction, 
accomplish a "sale," a "conveyance," or a "transfer" within the 
meaning of the due-on-sale clause. After all was said and done, 
Mrs. Bailey no longer owned and occupied the Springfield, Virginia 
20 
property. Equally, when it was all over, the Williams did. The 
due-on-sale clause therefore operated and required appellants to 
20 In construction of a contract, the purpose of the contract 
is more important than the academic defi~ition of the words 
used. Krikorian v. Dailey, 171 Va. 16, 197 S.E. 442 (1938) · 
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satisfy in full the accelerated loans secured by the security 
21 
deeds of trust. 
21 In another context, Dean, later Solicitor General, Erwin 
J. Griswold, impressive teacher and distinguished lawyer, used 
a telling phrase to deal with situations, in the federal tax 
area, in which practitioners, by exalting the formality of 
words over their true substance, would seek to obtain unwar-
ranted, unreasonable, and unfair advantages. The cases would 
inevitably be lost, to the infinite disgust of the ingenious 
practitioners. Dean Griswold called them "You think you're 
smart cases." See,~, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 
469-70 (1935): 
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in 
respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the 
character of the proceeding by what actually 
occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation 
having no business or corporate purpose--a mere 
device which put on the form of a corporate re-
organization as a disguise for concealing its 
real character . . • • 
In these circumstances, the facts speak 
for themselves and are susceptible of but one 
internretation. The whole undertaking, though 
conducted according to the terms of subdivision 
(B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form 
of conveyance masquerading as a corporate re-
organization, and nothing else. The rule which 
excludes from consideration the motive of tax 
avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, 
because the transaction upon its face lies out-
side the plain intent of the statute. To hold 
otherwise would be to exalt arti'fice above 
reality ...• 
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II. Lien or Encumbrance 
Elaborateness having failed, appellants turn to sim-
plicity itself. They point to the FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust 
language excluding a lien or encumbrance subordinate to the deed 
of trust from the operation of the due-on-sale clause. The deed 
of trust note, it is true, comes ahead of any possessory interests 
or rights of enjoyment, whether held by Mrs. Bailey as grantor 
or the Williams as grantees, taking precedence in the event of 
default. Every interest is subordinate to the deed of trust. It 
is a first lien. 
The simple argument has a simple answer. While subordin-
ate to the deed of trust, the right to "enjoy the structure as 
their home" was not a "lien or encumbrance." It was not for the 
purpose of securing an obligation. The deed of trust in favor 
of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington securing 
the note was a lien or encumbrance; the interests of the Williams 
were not. Rather, in every realistic sense, their interest, 
regardless of whether, for some purposes, it was real or personal 
property, was a fee simple, i.e. beneficial, ownership, subject 
to the security interest created by the first deed of trust securing 
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22 
the note to First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Arlington. 
The overly broad meaning which the appellants seek to 
attach to "lien and encumbrance" would encompass any interest 
created in the property. It thereby would cause what was clearly 
meant as a limited exclusion from the due-on-sale clause applicable 
ir. a few cases only to expand so hugely as to swallow-up and ex-
tinguish altogether the due-on-sale clause itself. That argument, 
consequently, fails. 
In fact, the exception from the triggering of a due-on-
sale clause when a subordinated lien or encumbrance was imposed on 
the property was a requirement of the FHLBB included in its overall 
22 A beneficial ownership interest is not an encumbrance. 
See, ~· Annotated Code of Virginia§ 8.9-lOS(g): "'Encumbrance' 
includes real estate mortgages and other rights in real estate 
that are not ownership interests;" (Emphasis added). 
Appellants do not appear to contend that the beneficial 
ownership interests are a "lien." They are right not to do 
so. While that term is capable of a variety of uses, here 
it evidently signifies the customary meaning: ":t claim .. 
upon the property ... as a security for some debt or charge." 
2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1978. Again, beneficial owner-
ship interests are not encompassed within the word "lien." 
In sum, the rights to beneficial ownership, possession, 
and enjoyment fall outside the concept of "lien or encum-
brance." 
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authorization of the due-on-sale clause. It is absurd to think, 
as appellants argue, that the provision was meant to take away com-
pletely with one hand what the Bank Board was plainly conferring 
24 
with the other. 
III. Restraint on Alienation 
There remain for consideration restraint on alienation 
and Virginia antitrust attacks launched against the deed of trust 
23 The authorization reads: 
An association continues to have the 
power to include, as a matter of contract 
between it and the borrower, a provision in 
its loan instrument whereby the association 
may, at its option, declare immediately due 
and payable sums secured by the association's 
security instrument if all or any part of 
the real property securing the loan is sold 
or transferred by the borrower without the 
association's prior written consent. 
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (formerly 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(f)). 
However, the regulations in 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) go on to 
prohibit exercise of a due-on-sale clause as a consequence 
of "creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to 
the association's security instrument." 
24 Appellants appear to have abandoned a final argument asserted 
in their complaint: "Finally, Plaintiff Beneficiaries are 
'assigns' of Mortgagors per 11 15 (sic) of' the deed of trust. 
(Presumably the reference was intended to be 11 13)." In all 
events the contention is totally unpersuasive. The assignment 
provisions of the deed of trust explicitly state that they are 
"subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 hereof." Paragraph 
17 contains the due-on-sale clause. 
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in the FNMA-FHLMC form between the Potes, as borrowers, and 
Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association (as successor to Atlantic 
Mortgage Company Division of NBD Mortgage Company), as lender. 
We turn first to the restraint on alienation contention. 25 
25 Appellants' counsel traces the origins of the legal 
concept outlawing unreasonable restraints on alienation to 
the 1290 Statute Quia Emptores, the Statute of Westminster, 
18 Edw. I. ch. 1. That statute, eliminating the feudal rela-
tionship of the feoffee to all mesne lords beneath the king, 
and limiting to the king the right to impose restraints on 
alienation, is only of historical interest. There has been 
little occasion to invoke the statute in the United States, 
because of the allodial nature of holdings in this country. 
28 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 74-75 (Estates§ 4). Tenure in Virginia is 
allodial. 1 Minor, Real Property, § 16 (2d ed. 1928). 
In considering the due-on-sale clause it merits remembering 
that it is "imposed" not by a predecessor in the homeowner's 
chain of title--a mesne landlord, but by a collateral lender 
concerned with security for its loan. Quia Emptores hardly 
seems to extend to such matters. ~~ 
Nevertheless, regardless of the source, there is a general 
rule forbidding the fettering of rights of ownership so as to 
permit someone else to control its alienation or use. 61 Am. 
Jur. 2d p. 108 (Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation, 
§ 100). At the same time, a limited and reasonable restraint 
on the power of alienation may be valid. Id. p. 111, § 102. 
For our purposes, we need not finally determine whether there 
is no restraint of alienation at all. The result will not 
differ, should we conclude that there was no restraint, or should 
we determine that, if there be restraint, it is reasonable. 
Application of the doctrine outlawing unreasonable restraints 
does not appear to turn on whether the relation of the person 
creating or enjoying the restraint is in the direct line of 
title, or a collateral one. 
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At the outset we mention, but pass by, the possibility 
that the Federal government, through appropriate actions of 
congress and the proper administrative agency or agencies, has 
fully preempted, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, Clause 
2 of the United States Constitution, any state regulation of due-
on-sale clauses in the loan instruments of federal associations. 
Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox, ~59 F. Supp. 
903 (C.D. Cal. 1978), partial summary judgment made final, 481 
F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1979); see also Meyers v. Beverly Hills 
Federal Savings and Loan Association, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 
1974); First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Boston v. 
Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (1st Cir. 1979); Conference of Federal 
Savings and Loan Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 
1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980). The Court in Glendale 
held that federal law, and specifically the FHLBB's authorization, 
26 
through 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-ll(f), of due-on-sale clauses, exclusively 
governed. California law, the Court concluded, was "inapplicable 
to Glendale Federal's loan instruments executed on and after June 
8, 1976." Id. at 912. To like effect, Conference of Federal Savings 
and Loan Associations v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979), 
appeal pending; Bailey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association 
Of Ottawa, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979). 
26 Recodified in 1980 at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f). 
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We pass that simple manner of disposing of the case for 
several reasons. We by no means wish to intimate that such a solu-
tion would be improper, or that, under preemptive federal law, the 
due-on-sale clause would not be fully operative. Rather, as the 
case has been presented to us, there would be too many uncertainties, 
or assumptions necessitated by absence of proof to justify that 
route. There is another, better marked path which leads to the 
same result. 
The uncertainties as to preemption by federal law are 
several: 
1. The preemption is more evident when the lender 
is a federally chartered association. While the federal con-
nections of Washington-Lee Savings and Loan Association are, 
from appellants' own pleading, evidently substantial, and while 
the FNMA-FHLMC Uniform Instrument has been employed, still the 
association is state chartered, and possibly complex questions 
arise over preemption insofar as its lending activities are con-
cerned. The uncertainty is in no way minimized when one realizes 
that the original lender, Atlantic Mortgage Company Division of 
NBD Mortgage Company, as far as the record discloses, had no federal 
charter or other federal status. 
2. The deed of trust was entered on March 15, 1976, 
prior to June 8, 1976, the effective date of the due-on-sale 
clause regulations of the FHLBB. There is authority that preemption 
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and associated validation of due-on-sale clauses were extant even 
prior to June 8, 1976, 
27 
although the court in Glendale was careful 
tD observe that the "contention is not before the court on this 
motion, and the court expresses no view as to its merit." Glendale, 
supra, 459 F. Supp. at 907. 
3. Whatever the power to preempt may be or may have 
been, it seems probable that the FHLBB has not sought, in the 
Virginia denominated FNMA-FHLMC uniform instrument form of June 
1975 employed in the Pote transaction, to impose on the states 
conditions with respect to mortgages or deeds of trust which 
would be in violation of state law. As previously pointed out, 
the FNMA-FHLMC deed of trust formulated for Virginia transactions 
specifically makes controlling the law of the jurisdiction in which 
the property is located. 28 
27 See Conference of Federal Savings and Loan Associations v. 
SteI""n';" supra, 495 F. Supp. at 17: 
California law with respect to the 
validity and exercisability of due-on-
sale clauses in the loan instruments of the 
plaintiff Federal associations is inapplic-
able whether such instruments were executed 
before or after the effective date of 12 
C . F . R. § 5 4 5 . 6-11 ( f) and ( g) . 
See also, Bailey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Ottawa, U.S.D.C. C.D. Ill., No. 78-1272, October 2, 1979. 
28 We are fortunately spared the complications associated with 
what to do where a due-on-sale clause is valid under federal 
law, but in a particular case leads to a result which_ state law 
would disallow as inequitable. See First Federal Savings and Loan 
Association of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 160 (Fla. 
App. 1980) ("The true issue before us is not whether a due-on-sale 
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paralleled by the FHLBB regulation 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (2) for-
bidding "a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of 
~e loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause." 
Therefore, putting to one side the preemption question, we 
proceed to inquire whether an inappropriate restraint on alienation, 
under Virginia law, exists. To do that properly, we must range beyond 
the specific question of the due-on-sale clause itself. Viewed in isola-
29 
tion, it cannot be said to create a restraint on alienation, or if 
29 Occidental Savings and Loan Association v. Vence Partnership, 
206 Neb. 469, , 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1980) ("An examination of 
the law pertaining to restraints on alienation makes it clear that 
a 'due on sale' clause is not a restraint on alienation and 
cannot be so considered for any purpose, theoretical or practical.") 
The due-on-sale clause, standing by itself, can hardly be a re-
straint on alienation. In the first place, its effect is to remove 
a lien or encumbrance--namely the security deed of trust--and 
thereby render the parcel of land more alienable--not less. More-
over, and perhaps more importantly, the homeowner whose property 
is subject to a due-on-sale clause is as free to sell, and, in 
selling, to realize as much as a homeowner holding the same prop-
erty free and clear of any encumbrance. See note 8, supra. Cf. 
"Enforcement," supra, at 926: --
To label the loss of a purported favorable 
economic position as a restraint on aliena-
tion is a misconception of that doctrine, 
which was not intended to provide profitability 
of alienation, but only the a~ility to alienate 
without penalty. 
The point is tellingly made by Justice Clark dissenting in 
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d, 943, 954, 582 P.2d 
970, 977 (1978): 
Additionally, the majority opinion awards the 
owner of the encumbered real property a bonus 
in that he can now sell his property for some-
thing in excess of what he could sell it for 
if unencumbered. 
We have thus come full circle. In at-
tempting to take away contractual rights of 
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29 (Cont'd) 
lenders in order to assist borrowers in 
selling encumbered properties, the majority 
opinion has devised a scheme which affords 
yesterday's borrower a clear advantage over 
today's seller who comes to the marketplace 
with his property free from encumbrance. 
The majority's attempted rebuttal reads (21 Cal. 3d at 
951, 582 P.2d at 975, n.7): 
The argument of the dissent--that our 
holding places the seller of encumbered real 
property at a "competitive advantage" over 
the seller of unencumbered real property in 
periods of rising interest and tight money--
simply misses the point. The fact that 
market conditions may operate to hamper the 
sale of some real property during such 
periods certainly cannot be held to justify 
the hampering of all such sales regardless of 
whatever financing arrangements may be out-
standing against such property. Sellers of 
unencumbered real property have presumably 
benefited from lower interest rates in 
achieving their position. To require sellers 
of encumbered real property, who have not 
enjoyed this benefit, to suffer from market 
contingencies along with those who have, is 
to take a very narrow view of "competitive 
advantage." In any event we here concern 
ourselves with the effect of due-on provisions 
in the sale of properties subject to existing 
financing--not with the effect of market 
conditions upon properties not subject to 
existing financing. 
The dissent exposes that combination of non-sequitur and 
unsupported assumptions for what it is (21 Cal. 3d at 957, 
582 P.2d at 979 n.3}: 
The majority cling to the thesis that its 
decision today serves to eliminate restraints 
on alienation. However, in footnote 7 (~, 
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29 (Cont'd) 
P· 931 [of 2~ Cal. 3d, 582 P.2d at 975] 
i~ conc~de~ its.concern only for properties 
with existing financing to the disadvantage of 
unencumbered properties, when such properties 
are competing on the same market. In an at-
tempt to justify its lack of equal concerns, 
it argues that sellers of unencumbered real 
property "have presumably benefitted(sic) from 
lower interest rates in achieving their posi-
tion," and now such advantage should be bal-
anced in favor of those who have not benefited(sic), 
they being the sellers of encumbered real 
property. The presumption by the majority 
is completely gratuitous--nothing in the 
record nor in sound reason suppor~s it. 
See "Enforce!llent," supra, at 926: 
This logic problem is cogently noted in Mr. 
Justice Clark's ·dissenting opinion in 
Wellenkamp (Cal.). 
To make the point in another way, consider that the due-
on-sale clause does not preclude, forbid, or deter sale of the 
property free and clear at any time. It concerns instead only 
the time when the borrower must pay his obligation. It could 
hardly be seriously contended that, if a loan secured by a 
deed of trust to provide funds to purchase a house were, from 
the outset payable on demand, it would amount to an unreason= 
able restraint of alienation. So how can it be an unreason-
able restraint of alienation for the loan to be payable on 
demand under some conditions (in case of sale), and payable 
at fixed period intervals under other conditions (in case of 
continued ownership and occupancy)? The loan is on terms more 
favorable to the borrowers than a totally demand loan would 
be, or the terms of a variable interest rate deed of trust, 
which a demand deed of trust in important particulars 
strongly resembles. Correspondingly, "[i;]he economic 
effect of the variable interest rate mortgage and the exercise 
of the due-on clause to achieve an interest rate increase cannot 
be vastly different. "Enforcement," supra, at 930. The Potes 
seek to convert an advantage obtained by them when they first 
borrowed to buy the house, which there was no legal obligation 
for the lender to provide, into an even greater advantage. 
What the Potes argue ig that, when they acquired the property, 
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29 (Cont'd) 
they should have been granted a better deal, allowing full 
rights to maintain the full 30 year term status of the loan 
despite a change in the home ownership. The economics, if ~he 
loan agreement so provided, certainly, as long as conditions 
of rising interest rates continue, would then have been more 
attractive to the home buyer. On that reasoning, however, 
to call the due-on-sale clause a restraint on a subsequent 
alienation would logically constitute the use of 10% as the 
annual interest rate, instead of 7%, or 6%, or, indeed, any 
interest rate, an unreasonable restraint on alienation, as 
would, in fact, the requirement that the principal of the loan 
ever be repaid. The subsequent sale will be less attractive 
if the loan must be met. 
See "Enforcement," supra, at 926: 
The reduction of the purchase price brought 
about by the increase of interest rate should 
do nothing more than reduce the price of the 
property to that market rate commanded by 
similar properties which are not encumbered. 
The seller must use the favorable mortgage 
rate as a factor in establishing the price 
of the property, in excess of that available 
for unencumbered property. Thus, the reduc-
tion in price is nothing more than the loss 
of a "premium" engendered by the mortgage 
rate. 
It is simply a misperception to eviscerate, as the California 
majority in Wellenkamp appears ready to eviscerate, as a 
restraint on alienation, a clause that only precludes the 
homeowner from realizing an additional and unbargained for 
economic advantage because interest rates have risen since 
the time when he secured, by mortgage or deed of trust, his 
promise to repay what he borrowed. 
Cf. Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
73 MTch. App. 163, 165, 250 N.W.2d 804, 805 (1977), another 
case where the court decided that its disenchantment with a 
due-on-sale clause was so great that it would be invalidated, 
although with a reluctant acknowledgment that "the due-on-
sale clause in question does not fit within the definition of 
a restraint on alienation found in the Restatement of the Law 
of Property." 
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30 
it does, it is one validated by the Virginia legislature. 
The due-on-sale clause is but one piece in a larger 
puzzle: A loan obtained to finance in part the purchase of one's 
home, for which one has given security in the form of a deed of 
trust or mortgage, has a variety of facets. Initially, it is viewed 
as an arrangement which will run its full course, here 30 years. 
So long as the homeowner continues to own and occupy the house, 
he is interested in the protection against call, in the preserva-
tion of his right not to pay more than the level monthly payment 
fixed at the outset, and contemplated to remain constant during 
the whole 360 month period. 
But, as time marches on, things may, and frequently do 
change. Leaving aside, for the moment, the problems associated with 
changing interest rates, the homeowner may decide to move, preferring 
another house, or having been transferred by an employer to another 
part of the country. He wants to sell. Sometimes ineptly drawn 
mortgages or deeds of trust make it a breach of contract to sell 
31 
without the prior consent of the lender. The need to obtain 
30 Such is the inescapable effect of Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.33 
and 330.34, supra, note 7. 
31 Even if the only penalty expressed for such a default is 
the creation of a right to accelerate and to compel repayment 
in full of the deed of trust note, the imposition in the 
contemplation of the law is unreasonable. A per~on should not 
be placed in a position in which he or she must violate an 
agreement, must dishonor his promise, to achieve a result. 
- 38 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the prior consent of another is a text-book example of an unreason-
~ble restraint on alienation. 
In such a situation, while the due-on-sale clause may 
not be directly involved, still there is something amiss in the 
32 
total scheme for dealing with any acceleration of the otherwise 
anticipated 30 year obligation. Whenever the thing that is wrong 
represents an attempted unfair advantage to thelender, the courts, 
not just in Virginia, but throughout the United States, seek to 
achieve justice by denying to the usually economically superior 
lender, with presumably the better bargaining position, other 
advantages in the package of provisions in the deed of trust 
concerning acceleration. 
Two lower court Virginia cases illustrate the point: 
1. Best v. United Virginia Bank/National, in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County, in Chancery, No. 58379, decree dated 
February 22, 1979. There a deed of trust executed September 25, 
1972 contained a flat undertaking by the maker of the note that 
he would "not assign or transfer the property secured by this 
deed of trust without prior approval of the noteholder." The deed 
32 Usually the acceleration is considered a "call" if 
initiated by the lender, and "prepayment" if brought about 
by the borrower. 
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of trust called for automatic acceleration of the full principal upon 
breach of that covenant. The Chancellor ruled that there was a 
restraint on alienation, and that it was unreasonable, explicitly 
pointing out, however, that if the lender had "wanted to reserve the 
right to increase the interest rate . . the parties could have 
contracted for such a provision. . . An appeal to the Virginia 
Supreme Court is currently pending. 
2. Iron Castle Associates v. Wood, in the Circuit Court of 
the City of Richmond, Chancery No. G-4808-2, decree dated February 
26, 1981. In 1972, a deed of trust was placed on the property as 
security for part of the sales price. There was a covenant by grant-
ers: "that they will not transfer the title to the property so long 
as this deed of trust remains in full force and effect, without the 
consent of the holder or holders of the two notes, which consent 
shall not be unreasonably withheld." 
Both cases, consequently, involved a flat restraint on 
33 
alienation. Furthermore, the deed of trust in each case antedated 
the 1974 enactment of Va. Ann. Code §§ 6.1-330.33 and .34. 
33 Other prohibition of sale without consent of the lender cases 
include: Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 62-63 (Miss. 1975) 
("The within property shall not be sold or encumbered without the 
express written consent of the within mortgagees, or their as-
signs."); First Federal Savings and Loan,Association of Englewood 
v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156, 157 (Fla. App. 1980) ("No conveyance 
of said property, or any part thereof, shall be made by Mortgagor 
without the written consent of Mortgagee."). Cf. First Southern 
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Brittoil;" 345 So. 2d 300, 
301 (Ala. App. 1977) ("The particular clause ••• is as follows: 
' ... The Mortgagor shall not sell or transfer titl7 ••.• with-
out the written approval of the Mortgagee, and any violation 
shall constitute a default •.• and, at the option of the 
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The lenders are not favored creatures of the law, at 
least as compared to borrowers. They must dot the "i"s and cross 
the "t"s. The due-on-sale clause sometimes evokes strong feelings. 
~ the dissent in Crockett v. First Federal Savincrs and Loan Asso-
ciation of Charlotte, 289 N. Car. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976), where 
the language used includes: "a loan shark's trap for the unwary 
borrower," 289 N. Car. at 634, 224 S.E.2d at 589, and "sheer extortion," 
289 N. Car. at 642, 224 S.E.2d at 594. 
If the interest rates go much higher, the legal profession 
may have to cede to lenders precedence in Shakespeare's trenchant 
line: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." 34 
33 
34 
(Cont'd) 
Mortgagee, all amounts secured by this mortgage shall become due 
and payable.'"); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 584 (Fla. 
App. 1970) ("It is hereby agreed that in the event of transfer 
of ownership •.. the Mortgagee has the right and privilege of 
accepting or rejecting ... such successor in ownership."); Terry 
v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 653, 604 P.wd 504, 505 (1979) ("The 
contract ... was 'not assignable nor [could] the buyer convey 
the property without the seller's written consent.'"). But see 
Baker v. Loves Park Savings and Loan Association, 61 Ill-:--2°d-rl9, 
121, 333 N.E.2d 1, 2 (1975) (Although the mortgage flatly pro-
hibited a sale, assignment or transfer of any right, title or in-
terest without the prior written consent of the mortgagee, the 
prohibition was, neve=theless, upheld as a reasonable restraint 
on alienation, justifying an increase in the interest rate, a 
sanction for default provided in the mortgage in addition to 
the right to call the lean.) 
Such an attitude no douht underlies a tendency to deny the 
advantages of a due-on-sale clause to a lender, on the grounds 
that the prospect of an acceleration upon sale was disguised, 
or at least not clearly revealed to the borrower. First Southern 
Federal Savings & Loan Association of Mobile v. Britton, 345 
So. 2d 300, 303-04 (Ala. 1977) ·("We do not say that the mort-
gagee may not specifically contract for the option to accelerate 
in the event of sale unless the purchaser agrees to payment of 
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Nevertheless, the lenders have legal rights, too. If 
they have complied with all requirements of the law, they are 
entitled to enforce their due-on-sale clauses, for they are simply 
not restraints on alienation. 
In the economics of the moment, the most evident target 
is obviously the right of the lender to call when, interest rates 
having risen, it is to its advantage to terminate the loan, and 
34 (Cont'd) 
increased interest up to the current rate at time of assumption 
of the unpaid mortgage balance. We do hold that such purpose 
may not be hidden behind a clause which is assumed to only 
provide protection for the security. If the clause is to be 
used to advance the financial interest of the lender . . . an 
increase in the interest rate, such purpose must be openly 
stated and bargained for .... If the condition .•. may be 
hidden •.. , the mortgagor will be at the mercy of the mort-
gagee.") That decision of the Court of Civil Appeals of 
Alabama was held by the Alabama Supreme Court to be in error. 
Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485, 487 (Ala. 1979). Cf. 
''Enforcement," supra, at 927. 
In Virginia, however, any judicial concern on that score is 
stilled by Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34. Cf. "Enforcement," supra, 
at 932: 
To the extent that the lack of state-
ment of this underlying purpose of the due-
on clause is interposed to bar enforcement 
for the purpose of increasing interest rate, 
the now widely used FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mort-
gage Instrument attempts to provide 'a clear 
statement of this purpose. 
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35 
relend the accelerated principal at better rates. It is in such 
contexts of something elsewhere rotten in the State of Denmark that 
lenders have been denied the right to activate due-on-sale clauses. 36 
35 What goes up must, of course, ultimately come down. At some 
time, interest rates may fall. Within the living memory of man, 
mortgage interest rates have been as low as 5%, and just possibly 
may, in time, return to such a level. In such circumstances, the 
homeowner would want acceleration of the loan in case he should 
sell. With rates declining, say, to 5% as against the 8.5% 
called for in the Pote deed of trust note of March 15, 1976, 
no punishment to the lender would result from invalidation of the 
due-on-sale clause, because there existed a requirement of 
consent from the lender before any sale couldproperly be made. 
Generally (absent an unusual risk to the stabi.lity of the security) 
the lender would be happy to have the deed of trust assumed by a 
purchase~with no acceleration, in view of the favorable interest 
rate. Thus, where interest rates have fallen, it would be the 
prohibition on sale without consent itself which the ho~eowner 
would be interested in seeing invalidated. 
If acceleration upon sale were not permitted to the homeowner 
in an atmosphere of declining interest rates (or if he could 
accelerate only upon the payment of a substantial premium or 
penalty), the homeowner would be placed in a situation where he 
could not sell on as favorable terms as would be the case if he 
were an owner of his premises free and clear of the lien or 
encumbrance of a deed of trust. As already observed, that 
disadvantage manifestly is a restraint on alienation. See Iron 
Castle Associates v. Wood, supra; ~· supra. 
36 Related to the results where there is something amiss, are 
similar results achieved by narrowly limited interpretation 
where the deed of trust contains language indicating an under-
standing of the parties that the due-on-sale clause was intended 
only as a protection of the lender's secarity interest. Some-
times the security instrument may remark that a purpose of the 
due-on-sale clause is to protect the lender's security. Apply-
ing expressio unius est exclusio alterius, courts have fore-
closed resort to the'"dUe-on-sale clause absent a showing by 
the lender that the security would be impaired (not usually an 
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36 (Cont'd) 
easy burden since the selling homeowner remains obliged to 
pay the note, with the purchaser of the home, who assumes the 
debt, an additional obliger). See Best, supra, where a clause 
providing for acceleration in case of an unapproved sale was 
described as include~ in the deed of trust "in order more fully 
to protect the security of the Deed of Trust." Cf. First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Englewood v. LockWood, supra, 
385 So. 2d at 159: '"It is the intent of this mortgage~ 
secure payment of said note ... ' Thus, the sole purpose set 
out by First Federal deals with the protection of its security." 
Other courts have taken the further questionable step of 
asserting that any purpose underlying the insistence by a lender 
on a due-on-sale clause save protection of the security (and in 
particular a purpose 'to protect against the adverse consequences 
of rising interest rates) is not permitted by law. Wellenkamp 
v. Bank of America, supra, 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77: 
"For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a due-on-sale clause 
contained in a promissory note or deed of trust cannot be enforced 
upon the occurrence of an outright sale unless the lender can 
demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect 
against impairment to its security or the risk of default." 
See also Patton v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
PhOenIX;° 118 Ariz. 473, 478-79, 578 P.2d 152, 157-58 (1978) 
(" ... we ... hold that the 'due on sale' clause cannot be 
enforced unless First Federal can show that its security is 
jeopardized by the transfer of the subject property ...• "); 
Bellingham First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Garrison, 
supra, 87 Wash. 2d at 441, 553 P.2d at 1092; Annotation, Validity, 
construction, and Application of Clause Entitling Mortgagee to 
Acceleration of Balance Due in Case of Conveyance or Transfer of 
Mortgaged Property, 69 A.L.R.3d 713, 749-50 (1976). 
No Virginia case has so held, and such a decision would be 
difficult to sustain in light of Article I, Section 1 of the 
Virginia Constitution (the Bill of Rights); cf. Young v. Common-
wealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E. 327 (1903). 
Nor has any Virginia case reasoned that, unless the document 
expressly spells out a particular reason ~or the inclusion of 
the due-on-sale clause (i.e., here, the right to minimize the 
adverse consequences of rises in interest rates), it is to be 
deemed that no such purpose for the clause was intended by the 
parties. (For example, contrast an intermediate appellate court 
in New York which has held that the failure to state in the 
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That, should not, however, be confused with the situation 
where nothing else in the package is amiss. Then the due-on-sale 
37 
clause may be relied on by the lender. There is nothing inherently 
36 (Cont'd) 
mortgage, as the purpose of the due-on-sale clause, the wish 
to raise the interest rate, to protect against market fluctuation, 
precludes exercise of a due-on-sale clause when that indeed is 
the only purpose. Silver v. Rochester Savings Bank, 73 App. Div. 2c 
81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980) (mortgage provided mortgagee would 
not unreasonably withhold consent to a sale,)) Under the FNMA/ 
FHLMC uniform deed of trust, that "interpretation" would be too 
forced. The Potes' deed of trust permits the due-on-sale clause 
to operate "[i)f all or any part of the Property or an interest 
therein is sold or transferred ... "except for four specific 
cases, none of which is applicable here: (i) subordinate lien 
or encumbrance, (ii) security for household appliances, (iii) suc-
cession by one life tenant on the death of another, and (iv) 
leasehold interest of less than three years. The interest rate 
fluctuation is evidently a, indeed the, principal underlying 
characteristic of home lending activrt"ies which leads lenders 
to insist on due-on-sale clauses. "Enforcement," supra, at 
896-97 (" ... whatever the traditional purpose of a due-on 
clause, its modern purpose has been to relieve the lender of 
low-interest rate loans in its portfolio."). It cannot reason-
ably be held not to have been contemplated as a reason for the 
clause. 
37 Such is the precise holding of the only Virginia authority 
which appears to be squarely on point. Lipps v. First American 
Savings & Loan Association, in the Circuit Court of Prince William 
County, Chancery No. 13246, decree dated March 19, 1980, appeal 
pending to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The court h~d ~e~ore 
it a transaction which used the June 1975 FNMA-FHLMC Virginia 
Uniform Instrument. It held that a sale brought into operation 
the due-on-sale clause, conferring on the savings and loan 
association the right to accelerate. It further held that the 
due-on-sale clause was legal and enforceable and in accordance 
with the statutes of Virginia. 
It is only the case's lack of finality because of the pe~d­
ing appeal which prevents us from giving preclusive effect in 
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unfair or unreasonable in such a rule. The reason making it important 
that the loan should run its full 30 year course dissipates when 
the homeowner sells. Then, in the huge majority of the cases at 
least (lenders, at the outset, having advanced on the security of 
the house only a portion of the purchase price, a reduction in the 
principal having occurred through monthly payments from time of 
original purchase to time of sale, and a usual consequence of infla-
tion being an increase in the value of the residence--Mrs. Bailey 
sold to the Williams for $79,903.63 premises for which she and her 
husband three years before had paid $63,831), the proceeds are 
available and adequate to meet the acceleration. 
Inspecting the details of the Pote deed of trust reveals 
no flaws in facets related to acceleration in the due-on-sale 
clause or in clauses other than the due-on-sale clause. 
It does not require the lender's consent to a sale. It 
only permits the lender, at its option, to exercise the due-on-sale 
clause if there has been a sale, which the Potes, as homeowners, are 
fully entitled to make without any dishonoring of their word. In 
37 (Cont'd) 
this matter of state law. However, for the reasons we have ad-
vanced, the case appears to have been rightly decided. Cf. 
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); West v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940); Six Companies 
of California v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 
188 (1940); C.I.R. v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). 
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-case the due-on-sale clause is activated, the resulting acceleration 
38 
may not give rise to any charge, premium or penalty. There is 
none provided for in the Pote deed of trust in case of a call by 
39 
the lender. 
38 The FHLBB regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (2), explicitly 
forbids "a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration 
of the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause." 
Va. Ann. Code§ 1.6-330.33 declares that "[n]o lender shall 
collect or receive any prepayment penalty on loans secured by 
real property . . . if said prepayment results from the enforce-
ment of the right to call the loan upon the sale of the real 
property which secures said loan." 
39 See Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savinqs & Loan Association, 
73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977). That case invalidated 
a due-on-sale clause, but in taking that action was careful to 
distinguish a North Carolina case, Crockett v. First Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association of Charlotte, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 
580 (1976), on the very grounds that "a mortgagor's ability to 
prepay without penalty and take advantage of declining interest 
rates supported a like ability on the part of the mortgagee to 
take advantage of interest rates in his favor." The note in 
Nichols imposed a penalty for prepayment. 
In upholding a due-on-sale clause in Crockett, the North 
Carolina court read the financing documents as creating a right 
in the lender to accelerate at its option, in the event of a sale, 
but further creating a right in the borrower "to prepay whenever 
he chose and take advantaae of lower interest rates in the market." 
Crockett, supra, 289 N.C. -at 626, 224 S.E.2d at 585. 
To the same effect is Century Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation of Bridgeton v. Van Glahn, 144 N;J. Super. 48, 54, 364 
A. 2d 558, 562 (1976) ("This mortgage may be prepaid. Thus if, 
in this case, the interest rate had fallen, the borrower would 
have been privileged to refinance his debt elsewhere at the.lower 
rate and pay off the loan. The borrower may repay the entire 
debt without penalty three years after the date of the mortgage, 
although slight penalties prior to that date are assessed."). 
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As for a prepayment, not accompanying a sale, there is 
nothing about which the Potes were entitled to complain. A right 
to prepay in whole or in part at any time was specifically conferred 
in the note secured by the deed of trust. After the first 5 years 
of the life of the deed of trust, all or any part of the outstanding 
principal of theloan could be prepaid without any charge, premium, or 
penalty, regardless of the source of the funds used for prepayment. 
During the first 5 years, a charge, not to exceed 1% of the amount 
by which aggregate prepayments in any year were in excess of 20% 
of the original principal amount was collectible, if, but only if, 
the source of the prepayment funds was a lender to the Potes other 
than the note-holder (originally Atlantic Mortgage Company Division 
of NBD Mortgage Company, and, by succession, Washington-Lee Savings 
. . 40 
and Loan Association). 
Those penalties fell comfortably within the requirements 
of Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.27 41 in force when the deed of trust 
40 The maximum penalty for prepayment of the $44,000 Pote loan 
was, consequently, $352.00 (1% of $35,200, i.e. $44,000 less 
20% or $8800). No evidence was adduced by appellants to suggest 
that the penalty was excessive, given the need for the lender 
to incur the expense of investigations and decisions pre-
paratory to relending the prepayment. We cannot say simply 
from the figure of $352 itself, that it is excessive or other-
wise unjust. 
41 A 1979 amendment, renumbered § 6.1-330.27.1 made no changes 
of significance for the purposes with which we are concerned. 
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consequences of a breach of the statute forecloses the imposition 
of another, unspecified sanction. Fourth National Bank of N.Y. v. 
Francklyn, 120 U.S. 747, 756 (1887): 
'The liability and the remedy were created 
by the same statute. This being so, the 
remedy provided is exclusive of all others. 
A.general liability created by statute, 
without a remedy, may be enforced by common 
law action. But where the provision for 
the liability is coupled with a provision 
for a special remedy, that remedy, and that 
alone, must be employed.' 
Thus, the due-on-sale clause became available to the lender upon 
the Potes' sale to the Saltos. 44 
44 For cases from jurisdictions other than Virginia, not 
otherwise referred tc in this opinion, upholding the validity 
of due-on-sale clauses see Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 
(Tenn. 1973); Malouff v. Midland Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Mutual Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 
531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976); First Commercial Title Inc. v. Holmes, 
92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Tidewell v. Wittmeier, 150 
Ala. 253, 254-55, 43 So. 782, 783 (1907); Stockman v. Burke, 
305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 1975); People's Savings Association v. 
Standard Industries, Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 
(1970); Shalit v. Investors Savings and Loan Association, 101 
N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151 (1968); Stith v. Hudson City Savings 
Institution, 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Mutual Real 
Estate Investment Trust v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 
395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977). Cf. Miller v. Pacific First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976). 
Contra: Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78, , 
486 P.2d 190, 193 (1971) ("Absent an allegation that the purpose 
of the clause is in some respect being circumvented or that the 
mortgagee's security is jeopardized a plaintiff cannot be entitled 
to equitable relief,"); Continental Federal Savings and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977) ("No alle-
gation was made ..• to show the mortgagee's security as im-
paired .•.. we, therefore, find that it was unreasonable 
and inequitable for appellant to impose a one per cent transfer 
fee as a condition precedent to giving its consent to transf7r 
the mortgage because neither the note nor the mortgage contained 
such a provision; ..• "). 
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IV. Antitrust Law Contention 
Finally, we must briefly attend to the attenuated argument 
that a due-on-sale clause, without more, ipso facto violates the 
45 
Virginia antitrust law. In the first place, there is no evidence 
of any kind to suggest that adoption of the due-on-sale clause 
by the lenders to the Potes proceeded from a conspiracy or other 
combination. Each home lender, acting on its own, was quite capable 
of perceiving the benefits to it flowing from the due-on-sale clause 
and of instituting, without the cooperation or assistance of others, 
a uniform practice of requiring acceleration of the loan upon a 
sale of the premises. 
In essence, a due-on-sale clause only concerns a contractual 
undertaking as to when one must pay one's duly incurred debt. Its 
restraining effect on trade would be no more than that imposed on 
a homeowner and his real estate, for example, if someone were to 
reduce an obligation of his to judgment, and thereupon immediately 
should seek to realize by forcing sale of the premises. So customary 
a "restraint" would hardly fall within the ambit of the antitrust law 
without quite expli=it language, none of which appears in the 
Virginia statute. C0llection of a debt in and of itself does not 
45 Va. Ann. Code§ 59.1-9.5 makes unlawful "[e]very contract, 
combination or consp.i racy in restraint of trade or commerce· · 
- 51 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
constitute an antitrust violation. D. R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn 
Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165 (1915); Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. 
American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947). The Virginia antitrust 
law is to be "applied and construed ... in harmony with judicial 
interpretation of comparable federal statutory provisions." Va. 
Ann. Code § 59.1-9.17. 
Furthermore, the Virginia antitrust act excludes from 
its operation conduct vetted by an administrative agency, state 
46 
or federal. We have already observed that, while Washington-Lee 
Savings and Loan Association is state-chartered it, in the circum-
stances of this case, is intimately related to activities of FNMA, 
FHLMC and the FHLBB, the deed of trust having been developed and 
approved by those federal agencies. Washington-Lee Savings and Loan 
Association is a seller servicer for the FHLMC, a federally related 
46 Va. Code Ann. § 59.l-9.4(b) provides: 
Nothinq contained in this chapter shall 
make unlawful conduct that is authorized, 
regulated or approved (1) by a statute of 
this State, or (2) by an administrative or 
constitutionally established agency of this 
State or of the United States having juris-
diction of the subject matter and having 
authority to consider the anticompetitive 
effect, if any, of such conduct~ Nothing 
in this paragraph shall be construed to 
alter or terminate any other applicable 
limitation, exemption or exclusion. 
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lender. The FHLMC regularly purchases interests in mortgages and 
47 
deeds of trust. Manifestly the several federal agencies have 
the authority to consider the anticompetitive effect of due-on-sale 
clauses. 
Of course, it could be argued that Washington-Lee Savings 
and Loan Association is state-chartered, and no Virginia agency 
comparable to the FHLMC has addressed at all the question of the 
anticompetit~ve effect, if any, of due-on-sale clauses. We pass 
the question of why the Virginia antitrust law, if the legislature 
wanted to differentiate on the basis of status as federal agency 
47 The purpose of the due-on-sale clause evidently was to deter 
a practice which would diminish profits or cause losses to 
federal savings and loan institutions. If the result for which 
the appellants contend could be achieved, the development would, 
in the course of time, inexorably lead to an increase in inter-
est rates over and beyond and independent of increases attribut-
able to other factors. Essentially all future purchasers of 
homes in the end would suffer, just to permit a relative few 
who, despite sale, could hang on to the economic benefits of 
a mortgage or deed of trust with a favorable interest rate to 
benefit. Prevention of that is a public purpose which evidently 
outweighs the allowance of the windfall sought by the appellants 
in the transactions here under scrutiny. As Justice Davis dissent-
ing in Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, supra, 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 
582 P.2d at 977 so cogently put it: 
But our beneficence may be shortsighted. For 
in attempting to assist the Wellenkamps, the 
majority opinion must necessarily restrict if 
not dry up mortgage funds otherwise available 
to the next generation of borrowers. 
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contrasted to status as state agency, was drafted purely in terms 
of conduct. Nevertheless, in interpreting the Virginia antitrust 
statute, it is not reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended 
to allow federally chartered institutions to operate with a distinct 
competitive advantage over essentially identical Virginia institu-
48 
tions. It is a bizarre reading of an antitrust statute which 
leads to imposition of a palpable competitive disadvantage. 
Moreover, there is also an exclusion from the reach of 
the Virginia antitrust law for conduct that is authorized, regulated, 
or approved by a Virginia statute. Va. Ann. Code§ 59.l-9.4(b) (1). 
While appellants strenuously contend that Va. Ann. Code § 6.1-330.34 
calling for prominent display of a notice that there is a due-on-
sale clause whenever one appears in a mortgage or deed of trust is 
not an approval, we conclude that the manifestly broader coverage 
of "authorized, regulated or approved" suffices to insulate due-on-
sale clauses from the Virginia antitrust law, at any rate when 
48 One can only wonder where it leaves the jurisprudence of 
California with its state court decision, Wellenkamp v. Bank 
of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970 (1978), decided 
August 25, 1978, essentially voiding due-on-sale clauses for 
state lending institutions speedily followed, pn November 1, 
1978, by Glendale Federal Savings and Loai:i Association v. Fox, 
459 F. Supp. 903 (c.o. Cal. 1978), which held valid due-on-sale 
clauses in lending docUI11ents of federal associations. The state 
can hardly relish the competitive disadvantage inexorably 
following for state lending associations. 
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considered solely in and of themselves and not in connection 
with other activities. 
Thus, the due-on-sale clause was fully enforceable 
against the Potes. 
Judgment in all of the Consolidated 
Cases AFFIRMED. 
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